Optimal Portfolios for the Long Run
The primary critique of time diversification is theoretical and the primary defense empirical. Samuelson (1963) and Bodie (1995) point out that if stocks are less risky in the long run there is a free lunch for long-run equity investors. Bodie (1995) emphasizes the fact that time diversification violates the Black-Scholes option pricing model. If time diversification exists, then options hedging long-run equity risk should reflect a decreasing likelihood of loss over longer time periods (they don't) 1 .
Historically, stocks in the United States haven't been very risky over long holding periods. Campbell and Viceira (2003) argue that empirical evidence shows that stock returns are not independent and identically distributed over time (they tend to mean revert), which implies that long-run stock returns may be predictable and that long-run investors should overweight equities 2 . The authors find that the annualized standard deviation of stocks is actually lower than annually reinvested T-bills after fewer than 30 years. This leads to the counterintuitive conclusion that risk-averse investors should demand stocks as a hedging strategy against a long-term drop in real consumption.
Other empirical studies of optimal equity allocation over longer time horizons show equally strong support for time diversification. Dolvin, Templeton, and Rieber (2010) find that a 100% stock portfolio dominated other strategies for a retiree with a 40-year time horizon over historical rolling periods in the United States. Estrada (2013) finds evidence that stocks consistently outperformed bonds in an international sample over longer holding periods. Barberis (2000) shows how return predictability observed in U.S. data means that all but the most risk-averse investors would hold 100% equities for a 10-year or longer investment horizon. However, uncertainty over the persistence of time diversification will reduce the optimal allocation to equities.
The most convincing explanation for time diversification (and the mean reverting equity prices that cause time diversification) is perhaps sentiment-driven investor valuation (Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998) . Investors require a larger risk premium during recessions and are more risk tolerant during an expansion. This creates short-run volatility through regular swings in prices, but these prices even out over the long-run as valuations move toward their long-run average. Time diversification relies on these regular but irrational swings in values that follow business cycles. Our analysis is similar in scope to work by Hanna and Chen (1997) , although they focus entirely on U.S. returns using the Ibbotson data series and their focus is primarily on subjective and objective risk tolerance.
International Evidence of Time Diversification
In order to judge the reliability of time diversification, we conduct an empirical analysis of different portfolio combinations among 20 of the largest global equity markets. If time diversification exists outside the United States, then we may be more confident that behavioral factors exist which consistently produce mean-reverting equity returns and provide opportunities for long-run equity investors. If they do not exist or are inconsistent, this may call into question previously held beliefs about the importance of time horizon when determining portfolio allocations. Our objective in this paper is not to determine the reasons why time diversification may or may not exist in the future; it is to estimate empirically the existence of global time diversification and optimal portfolio allocation for those who wish to engage in time diversification strategies.
Equities have historically yielded higher average returns than bonds or cash, something commonly referred to as the equity risk premium (ERP). For example, between 1900 and 2012, stocks outperformed bonds in the United States by 6.24% per year, on average. Globally, the average ERP has been a slightly lower 4.42% over the same time period (approximately 2.0% less). The ERP has been positive for each of the 20 countries in the Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (DMS) dataset (obtained from Morningstar Direct) from 1900 to 2012.
In Table 1 we show the historical ERPs for stocks against cash and bonds, as well as the geometric annual real returns of cash (bills), bonds, and stocks. We include t-statistics for the ERPs for individual countries as well as the aggregate average ERPs across all the countries. While all of the ERPs are positive, most of the individual country ERPs do not have t-statistics greater than 2, especially when the ERP is proxied against bonds versus cash, which is likely a better proxy for longer term investors. This suggests that while stocks have outperformed cash and bonds on average, the outperformance is far from certain. The average ERPs across the 20 countries is positive (~4%) with significant t statistics (greater than 12). While we can say that stocks have outperformed cash and/or bonds with some degree of certainty, there is significant variation across countries regarding the level and the consistency of this outperformance. The majority of past empirical research on time diversification has been based on U.S. stock returns using historical periods either from 1926 to present (Ibbotson data) or 1802 to present (Siegel data) . For our analysis we use historical real stock returns from the DMS dataset. The DMS dataset consists of historical annual returns from 20 different countries 3 from 1900 to 2012 (113 years of data). This results in a total of 2,260 years of return data, which are roughly 10 times the annual returns reviewed by Siegel (2008) and approximately 25 times the annual returns available in the Ibbotson data series.
The total market capitalization of the 20 countries included in the DMS dataset represented 94.6% of the total market capitalization of listed companies in 1988 based on data obtained from the World Bank website 4 . This percentage declined to 70.5% by 2012, yet still represents the majority of global publicly traded securities, especially over the full historical period considered.
We focus on the annual real returns earned by local investors in bills (cash), bonds, and stocks for the 20 respective countries in the DMS dataset. We use real returns under the assumption that investors in each country seek to maintain some level of inflation-adjusted wealth within that country. We use rolling returns for our analysis, both overlapping and distinct periods. For overlapping analysis we use the maximum number of return years available for each test period that roll forward through time. For example, our one-year return model would include each year from 1900 to 2012; however, for the 20-year period the last rolling set of returns would be assumed to begin in 1993. The use of overlapping periods results in underweighting the earliest and latest returns in the dataset, since, for example, the years 1900 and 2012 will only be used in a single 20-year simulation while the middle years (for example 1950) would be used in 20 different rolling periods. This is important given the poor relative performance of 2008 since it will show up less frequently than other periods.
For the distinct period analysis we assume the first year of available data (1900) is the first available investing year, where future periods roll forward through time. For example, a five-year investment period would be between 1900 to 1904, 1905 to 1909, etc. Unlike the overlapping analysis, we limit the distinct analysis to investment periods from 1 to 10 years (versus 1 to 20 years for the overlapping analysis). We do this to ensure some minimum number of test periods, which would be 11 given the data available.
We use the cumulative real growth of the portfolio value (i.e., final inflation-adjusted wealth over the period) to represent the "return" of the portfolio. Instead of using a definition of risk such as standard deviation, which treats outcomes above and below the target goal as equally risky, we use a utility function, which we believe better approximates how investors feel about good and bad outcomes. A utility function also allows us to consider cumulative wealth as the outcome versus annualized return dispersion. More specifically, we use a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function, as depicted in equation 1.
[1]
Equation 1 allows us to estimate the utility (U) received for a given value of wealth (W) for a given investment period (t). We estimate the ending inflation-adjusted (real) value of the portfolio for a given asset allocation at the end of the period for a given risk aversion coefficient (γ). The risk aversion coefficient measures the degree to which the investor (or decision-maker) is averse to taking risks. The larger the coefficient, the more risk averse the investor. We test levels of risk aversion from 1 5 to 20 in increments of 1 for this analysis.
We determine the optimal allocation to cash, bonds, and stocks for each scenario using a nonlinear optimization routine. The goal of the optimizer is to solve for the allocation that maximizes the resulting utility in equation 1, for a given investment period, risk aversion, and historical country returns. The two constraints for our optimization are that the total allocation across the three asset classes must be equal to 100% and that none of the asset class weights can be negative. 5 Technically the lowest value is 1.001, since a value of 1 would result in an infinite negative utility in our utility function. 
U t =

Results
For our first test we examine how the optimal allocation to equities changes across varying test periods for each of the different countries. We do this by determining the optimal allocation to equities for each country over each investment period (which is defined as the portfolio with the highest utility) and then running an ordinary least squared (OLS) regression where we regress the optimal equity allocations (Eq%) against the respective time periods (t), as noted by equation 2. For example, we find
The intercept (α) in equation 2 can be interpreted as the optimal equity allocation if there is neither an advantage nor a disadvantage in long holding periods. It can also be interpreted as the optimal equity allocation for a single period since the first observation of the independent variable t = 1. A positive slope (β) indicates a positive relationship between investment horizon and utility and a negative slope, the opposite. A negative slope would be consistent with the work of Pastor and Stambaugh (2012) . Figure 1 includes these optimal equity allocations (the blue diamonds) from years 1 to 20 for the overlapping analysis for a risk aversion (γ) of 4. Within Figure 1 we have run a simple linear regression (equation 2) on the resulting equity equations against the investment period to describe how the allocations change over time. As we can see in Figure 1 , the optimal equity allocation increases for longer holding periods (as t increase), and therefore the slope is positive (2.99%), suggesting time diversification has existed historically in the United States. Tables 2 and 3 . In Figure 1 we note an intercept (α) of 45.02% (which we will assume is 45% for simplicity purposes) and a slope (β) of .0299 (which for simplicity purposes we will assume is .03). Therefore the optimal historical allocation to equities for an investor with a five-year holding period would be 60% stocks, which would be determined by: 45% + 5(3%) = 60%.
We display the intercept and slope values for the regressions for four different levels of risk aversion (2, 4, 8, and 16 ) for each of the results for each of the 20 different countries for the overlapping analysis in Table 2 and for the distinct-period analysis in Table 3 . We include t-statistics for the average slope values in both Tables 2 and 3 to convey the statistical significance of the average.
We do not include t-statistics for the individual countries for the overlapping analysis (Table 2) because the periods are not independent. While there are techniques to potentially adjust for this, our primary concern is not whether time diversification exists for a given individual country, but its overall international applicability. We are also able to include t-statistics for individual country slopes for the distinct-period analysis in Table 3 . For the risk aversion levels of 2, 4, and 16 in Table 2 , 90% of the slopes are greater than 0 (18 of 20), while 95% of the slopes are greater than 0 (19 of 20) for a risk aversion level of 8. Those countries with negative slopes or slopes that are zero tend to be relatively small in absolute terms and already have relatively high intercepts (i.e., base equity allocation where t=0). The intercept and slope values vary significantly by country and by level of risk aversion; however, the average slope for each of the four levels of risk aversion is positive and the minimum t-statistic is 6.35 (where γ =2). This suggests the optimal allocation to equities has historically been higher over longer time periods.
Our results for the distinct-period analysis (Table 3) are very similar to Table 2 , especially in terms of the positive average slopes across the countries and the relatively large t-statistic. The average slope values are higher for the distinct analysis (Table 3 ) when compared to the overlapping analysis (Table 2) ; however this can be attributed to the different time periods for the two studies (the distinct analysis considers 1 to 10 years versus 1 to 20 years for the overlapping analysis). For both tests we find that the slopes, i.e., the relative attractiveness of equities over longer investing durations, increases for higher levels of risk aversion, while the average intercept decreases. This suggests stocks become increasingly attractive to risk-averse investors for longer investment periods, consistent with Campbell and Viceira (2003) .
In Figure 2 we average the optimal equity allocation across the 20 countries included in our overlapping analysis for the same risk aversion levels in Table 2 in Panel A and for the distinct periods in Table 3 in Panel B. We add the average results for γ =1 for comparison purposes 6
. Consistent with Tables 2 and 3 , we see that the optimal equity allocation is lower for shorter investment periods and for higher levels of risk aversion. The optimal allocation increases significantly, though, for longer investment horizons, and it increases faster for investors with higher levels of risk aversion. Even for a highly risk-averse investor with a risk aversion coefficient of 16, the equity allocation has been approximately 60% for an investment period of 10 years on average across the 20 countries, versus approximately 25% for an investment horizon of a single year for either the overlapping or distinct-period test.
Figure 2: Average Equity Allocation by Risk Aversion Coefficient and Investing Period
Figure 3 provides a more detailed perspective of the optimal equity allocations across each of the different time periods and levels of risk aversion considered for the analysis (a total of 400 scenarios) for the overlapping analysis. We use the overlapping periods because it contains a greater number of test periods (up to 20 years versus only up to 10 years for the distinct analysis). As a reminder, the actual risk aversion coefficient is 1.001, since a value of 1 would result in an infinite negative utility in our utility function. Optimal U.S. equity allocations have been relatively similar to the 20-country average. While U.S. portfolios tend to have slightly lower equity allocations for shorter investment periods and for higher levels of risk aversion, and slightly higher equity allocations for longer investment periods and for lower levels of risk aversion, the international results are similar. These results suggest that the empirical historical time diversification effect is robust in international data and similar in effect to U.S. data.
While historical optimal equity allocations in the United States are similar to the 20-country average, some countries differed significantly. We demonstrate these differences in Figure 4 (again for the overlapping analysis), which include the optimal equity allocation for Australia (Panel A) and Switzerland (Panel B). Optimal Australian portfolios are considerably more aggressive than the optimal Swiss portfolios, but in both cases there is some degree of time diversification where the optimal equity allocations tend to increase across an investment period for the same level of risk aversion, even if only slightly. The considerable differences in the optimal allocation to equities for different levels of risk aversion and over different investment periods (e.g., in Figures 3 and 4 ) could potentially be a result of the different level of historical returns experienced by each country. It may be that those countries that experience higher historical ERPs are more likely to have positive estimated slope values (β in equation 2). We note, for example, that Australia has had one of the higher historical ERPs while Switzerland has had one of the lower ERPs. If this relationship were to persist across countries, it could be that the time diversification effect could be explained entirely as a result of higher returns (potentially either stock returns, ERP, or some combination of the two).
We test this theory by regressing the estimated slope values (β in equation 2), which are proxies for how much the equity allocation should increase based on the length of the holding period (i.e., time diversification), against the average historical annual geometric equity risk premium (versus bills and bonds individually), real cash return, real bond return, and real stock return for the individual countries over the entire historical time period (1900 to 2012), which are included in Table 1 .
We find no significant or consistent relationship between any of the five return series and the estimated slope values. As an example we display the results for the ERP versus bonds and slopes (β) for the overlapping analysis where γ = 4. Note the t-statistic for slope in Figure 5 is only -1.22).
In other words, we cannot explain the apparent historical existence of time diversification at the individual country level through historical returns alone, since there is no meaningful relationship between the optimal level of time diversification and the historical returns across countries. 
Capturing the Serial Correlation
Our finding that equities have been more attractive investments for investors with longer investing durations suggests that there is some level of serial correlation (or autocorrelation) between returns across time. In other words, the return experienced this year is somehow (generally negatively) related to the return in the previous year (and potentially additional years before that). It is possible to capture this relationship by running regressions against the return for stocks (S) in a given year (t) versus the return in previous years (t -1, t -2, etc ), as noted by equation 3.
[3]
Equation 3 is an autoregressive model with five lags, which is also referred to as an AR (5) model. We acknowledge our selection of an AR(5) model is somewhat subjective and we selected it without attempting to select an AR model that optimally fits the data to reduce the potential bias in our analysis (e.g., we did not run any type of correlograms to fit the data). We run the AR(5) model (equation 3) against the annual real historical equity returns for each of the 20 countries. The results for these regressions are included in Table 4 .
Table 4: AR(5) Coefficients by Country
Unlike Tables 2 and 3 , where the individual country results were generally consistent, the AR(5) results are considerably less so, and the average results lack the same level of statistical significance. We see considerable differences across countries with respect to the relationship between past
Intercept (%) t-1 t-2 t-3 t-4 t-5
11. year returns and subsequent returns. We do see that the single lag period (t-1) tends to be positive, which suggests the existence of momentum (a relationship as noted by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) among others), although the coefficient is not-statistically significant. In contrast, the second and fourth lagged periods are usually negative and the average coefficient for the 20 countries is significant at the 5% level (with values of -5.11 and -2.66, respectively). The fact the second and fourth lags are negative is important within the context of time diversification, since it implies mean reversion, and is likely a key reason for the results noted in the previous section.
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Monte Carlo Simulation
The strong international evidence of time diversification has important implications for financial modeling; in particular Monte Carlo simulations, which are commonly used to estimate the range of potential portfolio outcomes for different types of clients. The majority of estimates used in Monte Carlo simulations do not incorporate any type of autoregressive model (i.e., assume that stock returns are independent and identically distributed, or iid), and implicitly assume time diversification doesn't exist. This has important implications for equity investors over longer time horizons.
In order to better approximate the historical risk of equities over time, we use the results for the United States in the AR(5) model in Table 4 . We select U.S. equity returns since they are relatively similar to the 20-country average, although in reality any country could be selected. We use equation 3 to model equity returns, where ε R is an independent white noise that follows a standard normal distribution with a mean of 0% and a standard deviation of 20% (which is the approximate standard deviation of the error terms), and the regression coefficients are based on the values in Table 4 .
To capture the real return of bonds (rr b ), we use equation 4, where the intercept (i b ) equals 1.75%, the slope coefficient (β s ) to the return on stocks (rr s ) equals .1, and the standard deviation for the error term (ε B ) equals 10.2%. When combined, this yields a model that has return, standard deviation, and correlations that are nearly identical as the historical real return on stocks and bonds over our analysis period.
[4]
We conduct a 10,000 run Monte Carlo simulation and apply the same type of analysis we did previously where we test investment periods from 1 to 20 years (in 1-year increments) and risk aversion coefficients from 1.001 to 20 (again, in increments of 1) for the 21 different stock and bond combinations where the allocations differ in 5% increments. The optimal allocation by risk aversion and investment period are included in Figure 6 .
Page 16 Figure 3 , the resulting equity allocations are slightly less aggressive than historical estimates. We attempted to explain this by conducting an additional analysis to see how fast equity markets in different countries recovered from the five largest historical annual market declines. We find that the recoveries are not any faster than predicted by our AR(5) model for each country. This is an important consideration since recoveries do not occur more rapidly, on average, than we would expect given our AR(5) model even for the worst historical returns. Therefore, we accept that the remaining differences may flow from the simplicity of our model. For example, we assume that returns are normally distributed (since the error terms are normally distributed), while equity returns have been noted to have non-normal characteristics in past research (Xiong and Idzorek, 2011, for example) .
Although an AR(5) model is not essential when running a Monte Carlo simulation, it does reasonably capture the historical level of time diversification associated with U.S. equities. Not using an autoregressive return for a Monte Carlo simulation makes the implicit assumption that time diversification does not exist. While this is inconsistent with historical international stock returns, there is no guarantee time diversification will continue to persist in the future. An ideal recommendation would be to temper historical findings with the reality of future uncertainty, although the empirical evidence supports an increasing allocation to equities with longer time horizons. Page 17 
Time Diversification Across Time
Our primary analysis looked at the entire period of available historical returns to explore the potential existence of time diversification across 20 countries. In order to investigate how the potential benefits of time diversification may have changed historically, we rerun our overlap analysis for smaller time periods (41 years each) that are assumed to "roll forward" by a decade. For example, the initial period is 1900 to 1940 (41 years inclusive), while the second period is 1910-1950, etc. The overlap across each test period is 31 years, which is approximately 75% of the test years. We do not conduct a distinct analysis given the relatively short period for each test.
In this analysis we test different allocations to cash, bonds, and stocks in 5% increment combinations for a total of 231 portfolios, and then select the combination that generates the highest utility versus solving for the true optimal allocation. We summarize the regression coefficients in Table 5 , which is similar to the average results across all countries in Tables 2 and 3 . We find that the intercept, which is effectively the optimal allocation for an investor with a one-year investing horizon, decreases in more recent time periods. The slope, which is the potential benefit from investing in equities over longer time periods, increases. This suggests the optimal equity allocation for shortterm investors has been decreasing historically while the potential benefits of time diversification have been increasing.
Table 5: Regression Equity Allocation Results Across Time
We include the results by country for investors with moderate risk tolerance (γ = 4) in Appendix 1, for those readers interested in a more detailed perspective about how the intercept and slope changes over time. While the aggregate results are relatively stable across all countries (Table 5) , the individual country results are considerably less so (Appendix I). In general, the optimal initial equity allocation was much higher between 1920 and 1960 (from 34% to 100%) than in more recent time periods (e.g. -7% to 61% between 1970 and 2010) . The intercept and slopes values in Table 5 should be compared to the average results in Table 2 (which are included in Table 5 ) instead of the individual country results, since they are the average across all countries. The slope of the annual time diversification benefit to equities appears to have risen consistently over time. In the most recent time period , an investor should have increased his or her optimal equity allocation by at least 2.5% for each additional year for 70% (14) of the countries studied. Between 1910 and 1950, only two countries saw such a large time diversification benefit. This suggests that while the equity premium in general may have declined in the late 20th century, the time diversification benefits from holding a greater portfolio share in equities have increased for longer-term investors.
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Implementing a Time Diversification Portfolio
While our results are consistent with the majority of the existing empirical research on time diversification, it is inconsistent with the Black-Scholes option pricing model as well as the recent work by Pastor and Stambaugh (2012) . Pastor and Stambaugh note that while we can treat historical parameters such as the ERP as certain, an investor today faces far more uncertainty into the future. Uncertainty becomes increasingly important over longer investment periods because estimation errors will compound over time.
In a previous analysis, we found no meaningful statistical relationship between the average historical ERPs (versus cash or bonds) by country and the level of time diversification exhibited by individual countries (defined as the slope resulting from the regression in equation 2). However, the future expected return on equities, especially relative to bonds, is likely to be a key driver in an investor's decision to adopt a time diversification strategy. For example, while the average annual compounded historical ERP across the 20 countries has been 3.56% (as noted in Table 1 ), an investor may feel some smaller number (such as 2%) may be a more reasonable estimate for the future.
A lower expected ERP may reduce the potential future benefit of time diversification. In this section we determine how low the ERP would have to have been historically to eliminate the benefit of time diversification for long-run investors. In other words, we seek to determine how much we must reduce (or potentially increase, in a few cases) the ERP to eliminate the benefit of higher equity allocations over longer holding periods.
Previously, we used equation 2 to approximate the relationship between the optimal equity allocations and the investment time period. The resulting slope (β) from equation 2 was positive for the majority of countries historically (~90%), as noted in Tables 2 and 3 , which suggests the existence of time diversification (i.e., the optimal allocation to equities increased over longer historical holding periods). If the estimated slope in equation 2 was zero, which would mean the optimal equity allocation did not change over the investment period, we would conclude that time diversification has not existed. We can extend this line of thinking to determine how much the historical return of equities would have had to change to eliminate the positive slope (or to call the existence of time diversification into question).
In this section we perform an analysis where we first determine the optimal allocation to equities over 1-, 5-, 10-, and 20-year investment horizons using overlapping historical data for all 20 countries for risk aversion levels of 2, 4, 8, and 16. Unlike each of the previous tests that include cash, bonds, and stocks, this analysis includes only bonds and stocks in the optimization opportunity set. We choose to exclude cash to simplify the analysis and because bonds are a more likely investment option for longer-term investors. We include the resulting optimal equity allocations for each of the simulations in Appendix 2 for reference purposes. Next, we determine the annual return change (i.e., alpha) required so that the optimal equity allocation for the 5-, 10-, and 20-year investment periods result is the same equity as the 1-year investment period using an optimization routine. We test alpha values from -10.0% to +10.0%. For example, in Appendix 2 the optimal equity allocation for a risk aversion level (γ) of 4 for a U.S. investor with a 1-year investment period would have been 47% versus 82% for the same investor with a 10-year investment period.
Our goal is determine how much less attractive 7 we must make the historical return on equities, relative to bonds, so that an investor with a 10-year investment period will only invest 47% in equities versus 82%. In other words, we determine how much we have to reduce the return on equities to make bonds more attractive over a longer investment period. This "alpha" context tells the reader how different historical returns would have had to have been in order to eliminate the benefits of time diversification.
We include the results of our analysis in Table 6 as the ERPs (versus bonds). The values in Table  6 are effectively the historical ERP required by country, for a given investment period and risk aversion, to make the optimal equity allocations for 5-, 10-, and 20-year investment periods the same as a 1-year investment period. This is constant risk over time, not increasing risk as suggested by Pastor and Stambaugh (2012) , which would result in even lower ERP values. -6.6 -6.6 -6.6 -6.6 -6.6 -6.6 -6.6 -6.6 -6.6 -5. In Table 6 we find ERPs that are small and mostly negative, especially at higher levels of risk aversion, although generally lacking statistical significance in many cases. For example, in order to eliminate the historical existence of time diversification, the average ERP (versus bonds) for a 10-year investment period for an investor with a risk aversion level of 4 would have had to have been -.7% (as noted in Table 6 ). In other words, stocks would have had to underperform bonds, on average, by -.7% per year over the historical period considered for there to be no potential benefit from time diversification.
These findings suggest that while future parameter uncertainty should be a concern for investors, the historical change in the return of equities required to eliminate the benefit of time diversification would be substantial. While the ERP varies by period and level of risk aversion, it is generally negative suggesting that for time diversification to provide no benefit 8 to an investor the ERP must not only disappear in the future, it must become negative. 8 No benefit is not the same thing as a cost, since the values in Table 6 
Conclusions
Many investors use higher portfolio equity allocations for long-run goals despite an active scientific debate over the existence of time diversification. Much of the evidence supporting time diversification comes from 20th century U.S. asset return data that may be a historical anomaly. In order to test whether time diversification is robust across a larger sample, we use historical real returns from 20 countries each with 113 years of real return data resulting in a total of in 2,260 return years. We then determine optimal portfolio allocations based on varying levels of risk aversion and investing periods.
Using a Constant Relative Risk Aversion utility function with varying risk levels and investment time periods, we find that the optimal allocation to equities tends to increase over longer investment periods. This adds to the empirical evidence supporting the existence of time diversification. The average optimal equity allocation across the 20 countries increases by 1.3% per year for low risk aversion (γ=2) portfolios, 2.1% per year for moderate risk aversion (γ=4) portfolios, 2.5% per year for high risk aversion (γ=8) portfolios, and 2.7% per year for extremely high risk aversion (γ=16) portfolios, based on our overlapping period analysis, with each being statistically significant at the .01% level.
We find the average historical equity allocation over varying investment periods and levels of risk aversion for U.S. equities is roughly consistent with the average equity allocation across all 20 countries, although certain countries such as Australia and Switzerland are considerably different than the all-country average. We are further able to replicate time diversification using an autoregressive model in a Monte Carlo setting and demonstrate how not considering this within a modeling setting can have important implications for the results of a given simulation.
Next, we test to see how time diversification has changed over the 20th century and find that the optimal equity allocations for shorter-term investors have been decreasing, but the optimal allocations for longer-term investors have been increasing (i.e., the benefits time diversification have increased over time). Finally, we determine that the ERP would need to have been zero or slightly negative to eliminate the historical benefit of time diversification. 
